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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide this
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2(j) (Supp. 1994).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err in finding that Sandy City had

any legitimate public purpose for the downzoning of the property of
Smith Investment Company and Sandy Hills, Inc. (collectively, the
"Smiths").
standard,

The standard of appellate review
with

determination.

no

deference

accorded

the

is a correctness
trial

court's

Cook v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 919 P.2d 56 (Utah

Ct. App. 1996).
2.

Did the trial court err in finding that Sandy City's

downzoning of the Smiths' property did not deprive the Smiths of
all economically viable uses of their land, and, therefore, did not
constitute a compensable taking.

The standard of appellate review

is a correctness standard, with no deference accorded the trial
court's determination.

Cook v. Zions First Nat'l Bankr 919 P.2d 56

(Utah Ct. App. 1996).

1

3.

Did the trial court err in finding that Sandy City's

decision to barricade 1055/1075 East Street was "appropriate."
The standard of appellate review is a correctness standard, with no
deference accorded the trial court's determination.

Cook v. Zions

First Nat'l Bank, 919 P.2d 56 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
1.

Utah

Constit. Art. I, § 22.

See Addendum

B for a

complete recitation of that section.
2.

U.S. Constit. Amend. V.

See Addendum B for a complete

recitation of that section.
3.

U.S. Constit. Amend. XIV.

See Addendum B for a complete

recitation of that section.
4.

Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89 (1963).

See Addendum B for a

complete recitation of that section.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Course of Proceedings.
This case involves cross-motions for summary judgment based

upon Sandy City's downzoning of approximately 15.8 acres of the
Smiths' property from commercial to residential.

The motions also

addressed the Smiths' claims of trespass and wrongful barricade
against Sandy City.
Oral arguments on the parties' dispositive cross-motions were
held before Judge Timothy R. Hanson in the Third Judicial District
2

Court on February 2, 1996. The court entered its Summary Judgment
and Order of Dismissal ("Summary Judgment") in Sandy City's favor
on September 23, 1996.

The Summary Judgment provided for the

following:
1.
commercial

Sandy Cityfs downzoning of the Smiths1 property from
to

residential

use

is

supported

by

a

rational

relationship to public health, safety and welfare, and the same
downzoning did not result in a "taking" because the Smiths are
still able to put the property to "some reasonable use," although
not the "highest and best use" of their property.
2.

Sandy City's approval of subdivision plats for Brighton

View and Del Ruby subdivisions does not support a cause of action
for trespass against Sandy City for escaping water from those
subdivisions1.
3.

Sandy City's action in barricading the street designated

as 1055/1075 East Street is not wrongful, as it allows the Smiths
other access to the Smiths' property.
On October 21, 1996, the Smiths filed their Notice of Appeal.
The appeal was "poured over" to this Court on January 2, 1997.

1

Although the Smiths' Notice of Appeal listed the trespass
claim as an issue to be determined on appeal, the Smiths have
decided not to pursue that issue.
3

B.

Statement of Facts,
Facts Material to the Smiths1 Takings Claim.
1.

In I960, Reed and Barbara Smith purchased approximately

2 3 acres of undeveloped property on the west side of 700 East
Street at 9200 South in South Salt Lake County, Utah.
2.

(R. at 135).

As specific conditions of that purchase, Mr. and Mrs.

Smith required that the property be annexed to Sandy City and
commercially zoned.

The property was annexed in May of 1960.

(R.

at 135).
3.
C-l.

In September, 1960, the property was commercially zoned

It was commercially rezoned C-2 in 1962.
4.

(R. at 135-136).

In late 1961 or early 1962, the Smiths began construction

of a shopping center on the property.

Sandy City welcomed the

development and assisted the Smiths in their endeavors.

In a

letter dated October 12, 1961, from Sandy City Corporation to Salt
Lake County, then Mayor Miller stated:
[t]he economic center of [Sandy City] has moved from
[8600 South between State Street and 300 East] and Sandy
City in June of 1960 after consideration of studies
prepared by the University of Utah relating to the
economics of Salt Lake Valley, traffic, population, and
service requirements, zoned a twenty-five (25) acre tract
commercial.

This tract is located at the corner of 9300
4

South and 7th East.

In relation to this tract. Sandy

City has co-operated with the developers of the tract in
order to assure them of a sound economic basis and a
representative development.
(Emphasis added).
5.

In

(R. at 137-138).

accordance

with

their

development

plan

and

at

substantial cost, the Smiths developed the front, or east portion
of the 2 3 acres with a service station and commercial building with
space for tenants, fronting 700 East.

The Smiths then added space

at the south end of the building for a grocery store.

The

commercial tenants changed over time; in the 1980fs, the Smiths
razed the service station and car wash.
6.

In

early

1980, the

planning

(R. at 138).
staff

of

Sandy

City

recommended that the rear 15.8 acres of the Smith property be
downzoned from C-2 to R-2-10 (allowing a duplex on a 10,000 foot
lot or a single family home on an 8,000 foot lot) or R-l-8
(allowing a single family home on an 8,000 foot lot).

The planning

staff recommended the change because:
1.

the Sandy Community Citizens' Report recommended
the western portion of the parcel be rezoned to
single family residential use;

5

the

Sandy

City

Comprehensive

Plan

Goals

and

Policies recommend to limit the depth of 700 East
commercial

development

to

2 00

feet

unless

conditional use approval is granted;

the existing 364,500 square feet of retail space
exceeds

the

Commercial/Industrial

Study

recommendation that Community Commercial should not
exceed 250,000 square feet retail space;

the stub roads into the parcel create traffic
circulation problems in the existing residential
and commercial development;

traffic from the area when developed should enter
and

leave

through

the

existing

residential

subdivision streets and not travel through the
commercial center; and

good

access

development

to

commercial

behind

the

or

existing

development would be difficult.

6

multiple

unit

commercial

(R. at 138-139).
7.

The

downzoning.

Smiths

vigorously

objected

to

the

proposed

They submitted their "Objections to Down-Zoning of

Commercial Property" dated September 29, 1980, to the Sandy City
Council and Sandy City Planning Commission.

The Smiths claimed

that the proposed downzoning was unconstitutional and patently
unfair because (1) the entire 2 3 acres was owned by one family
through its family companies and downzoning a portion of the entire
tract

was

unreasonable;

(2) the

Smiths

pioneered

commercial

development in the 700 East/9400 South vicinity with the blessing
and encouragement of Sandy City; (3) after purchasing the property,
the Smiths engaged the University of Utah's Bureau of Economic and
Business Research to complete a study and analysis of the Smith
property as a retail shopping center; (4) the study found the 2 3
acre parcel to be a prime commercial location as Sandy City grew in
population; (5) the downzoning would be confiscatory and would
destroy the highest and best use of the property; (6) the 2 00 foot
depth limit proposed is unrealistic and not in line with the depth
of the commercial zone in the direct vicinity (9400 South and 700
East) and on the east side of 700 East directly across from the
Smith property; and (7) the Smiths contemplated that development of
the entire tract would include removing some existing uses along

7

7 00 East such as the car wash, which was in fact razed.

(R. at

141-142) .
8.

On April 18, 1981, the Sandy City Council amended the

zoning map to downzone the rear 15.8 acres of the Smiths' property
to R-2-10. The Mayor approved the downzoning in May, 1981.

(R. at

144; 459-460) .
9.

In justification of the downzoning, Sandy City relied

upon the Sandy Community Citizens' Report and the Sandy City
Comprehensive Plan Goals & Policies.
10.

(R. at 140, 139; 459-460).

The Sandy City Comprehensive Plan Goals & Policies as

adopted in November, 1979, stated with respect to the proposed 700
East Commercial District:
[t]he 700 East Commercial District covering both sides of
700 East from the north city limits to 9800 South is
intended to encourage a type and quality of land use
along 700 East that will preclude the development of
typical strip commercial and to allow 700 East to
accomplish its function as an important high volume
traffic artery. Design requirements of this district
should result in 700 East developing into an attractive,
dignified thoroughfare with an efficient traffic flow and
minimum of accidents.
(emphasis added).

The downzoning, however, restrictively limits

the Smiths' commercially zoned property to a depth of about 200
feet, restricts the commercial development on the Smith property to
essentially a strip-type development, and results in a direct and

8

non-compensated diminution in the value of the property of over
$500,000.00.
11.

(R. at 143; 173-192; 463).

The previous C-2 zone would allow the larger lots called

for in the goal and policies for the 700 East Commercial District.
(R. at 143; 463).
The Sandy Community Citizens1 Report stated as its goal:

12.
"Encourage

commercial

development."

The committee

listed

the

following as its commercial policies:
Be selective in commercial uses.
Encourage employment for citizens of Sandy.
Widen sidewalks to 6'.
Provide landscaping as buffer especially when next to
residential or if the use closes late.
Consider uses such as furniture shops, clothing/dress
shops, residential services, sports shops, thrift shops.
Provide architectural review of plans in site review.
Many of the commercial uses suggested by the Report are uses that
were allowed in the C-2 zone.
13.

(R. at 140; 462).

The report of the Sandy City Planning Staff presented

before the Sandy City Council on September 30, 1980, included the
following recommendation:
[w]ith the existing commercial it appears there may be
excessive
commercially
zoned
land
and
developed
commercial square footage in this area for this type of
commercial use development.
Additional concerns were
over the number of stub streets that go into the back of
9

the property, existing street pattern and traffic
generation and the access to future commercial
development.
(R. at 460-461).
14.

However, because the existing commercial development and

the rear undeveloped acreage are in common ownership, the existing
development does not impede commercial development on the rear
acreage.

If necessary, the existing structures can be modified or

razed to open up the rear acreage to 700 East.

(R. at 143-144;

463) .
15.

The rear acreage of the property is surrounded on three

sides by existing subdivisions the homes in which are deteriorating
low-end housing 25 to 35 years old.

Constructing new homes in the

center of this developed area would fail to make any economic sense
and render the new homes virtually unmarketable.

Constructing a

rental complex of duplexes at the core of established single-family
homes would be detrimental to the existing community particularly
because of the intense and increased traffic which would traverse
the subdivision streets, namely Brighton View Drive. Furthermore,
the residential traffic would have no access to 700 East through
the existing Smith commercial development, since residential and
commercial uses should not be mingled in that fashion, and there
are no public streets giving the residentially zoned area access to
700 East.

(R. at 144; 203-217; 464).
10

16.

Restoration of the C-2 zone to the Smiths1 rear acreage

would ensure direct access of all commercial uses to 700 East, and
would not create traffic hazards in the surrounding subdivisions.
(R. at 145; 464) .
Facts Material to the Smiths1 Wrongful Barricade Claim
17.

The Smiths1 property is abutted by subdivisions on the

north, south, and west sides.

Approximately

property directly accesses 700 East Street.
18.
property

1055/1075
line

to

East
the

Street

southeast.

runs

from

The

286 feet of the

(R. at 694-695).
Smiths1

the

street

curves

southeast, resulting in a change of numerical designation.

north
to

the

(R. at

694) .
19.

On May 30, 1978, the Sandy City Council voted to install

permanent barricades at the south end of 1055 East.
20.

The barricades block egress and ingress to and from the

Smiths1 property.
21.

(R. at 695).

(R. at 740).

1055/1075 East Street had been used by the public for

over twelve years when Sandy City erected the barricade.

(R. at

740, 743, 764-766).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court clearly erred in its findings.

First, Sandy

City arbitrarily and capriciously downzoned a major portion of the
Smiths1 property, thus removing all possibility of economically
11

viable use for both commercial and residential purposes.

The

court, however, found that such downzoning was justified and
adequately

supported, despite the fact that the reasons, or

supposed "evils" that Sandy City was seeking to correct were in
fact either non-existent or problems of Sandy City's own making.
Furthermore, the court found that a compensable "taking" had not
occurred. Application of an overly restricted and narrow "takings"
analysis apparently required this conclusion.

The Smiths have

expected and intended to develop the entire parcel commercially
since

they

substantial

purchased

the

commitments,

property

investments

in
and

planning in reliance upon that expectation.

1960,

and

instituted

have

made

long-term

It is undisputed that

the highest and best use of the property is that of commercial
development, and that a portion of the Smith property was in fact
put to that use.

It is likewise undisputed that the downzoning

resulted in direct damage to the Smiths1; i.e., a diminution in the
value of their property of hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Despite these facts, and in contradiction to recent case law the
court found that compensation was not required.
Finally, Sandy City has erected barricades at the south end of
1055/1075 East Street.

These barricades effectively restrict

access to the Smiths1 property, and are in blatant disregard of the
fact that the street has been dedicated to the public use under
12

Utah

law.

Consequently,

the

trial

court's

entry

of

summary

judgment on these issues should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
I.
SANDY CITY'S DOWNZONING IS INVALID ON DUE
PROCESS GROUNDS BECAUSE IT BEARS NO RELATION
TO THE HEALTH, SAFETY OR WELFARE OF THE
COMMUNITY: EVEN ASSUMING. ARGUENDO, THAT THE
DOWNZONING IS A VALID EXERCISE OF THE POLICE
POWER. IT CONSTITUTES A COMPENSABLE TAKING.
A.

THE DOWNZONING IS INVALID BECAUSE IT BEARS NO RELATION TO
THE HEALTH, SAFETY OR WELFARE OF THE COMMUNITY AND IS
UNDULY OPPRESSIVE TO THE SMITHS.

Sandy City has attempted to justify its downzoning decision by
relying upon the "deference" granted zoning officials in these
matters.

However, accepting Sandy City's position in this case is

tantamount to disposing entirely of all fundamental due process
requirements and guarantees.

Contrary to the conclusion of the

trial

entity

court,

discretion

a governmental

when

its

actions

affect

does

not

private

enjoy

unfettered

property

rights.

Rather, the City must show that it is acting within its police
power, not only to promote the health, safety, morals and general
welfare of the community, but that a public benefit is in fact
conferred as well.

Here, Sandy City has failed to make any showing

that, through the downzoning, it was attempting to correct some

13

"evil"; furthermore, Sandy Cityfs alleged concerns, as fully set
forth below, are not alleviated by the downzoning.
In Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 787 P.2d 907 (Wash.
1990) cert denied 498 U.S. 911, the Supreme Court of Washington set
forth a three part test to determine whether a zoning regulation
violates substantive due process:

(1) whether the regulation was

aimed at achieving a legitimate public purpose; that is, whether
there was a public "evil" to correct; (2) whether the regulation
uses means reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose (whether it
tends to solve the problem) ; and (3) whether the regulation is
unduly oppressive to the landowner.

Id. at 913.

Under such an analysis, Sandy City's downzoning of the Smiths1
property cannot withstand attack or pass muster.

There is a

surprising paucity of reasons asserted by Sandy City for the
downzoning.

However, based upon the Sandy Community Citizens1

Report and the Sandy City Comprehensive Plan Goals & Policies, both
of which were admittedly relied upon by Sandy City, the reasons
appear to be based upon concerns regarding stub streets, access to
future commercial development, and a professed citizens1 preference
for a more limited commercial development.
These reasons are patently insufficient to support the City's
actions, particularly
Smiths.

in light of the economic impact on the

First, the "stub streets" referred to by the City extend
14

into the Smiths1 rear acreage.

The City claims that these streets

create traffic circulation problems, which are allegedly alleviated
by the change in zoning.

Second, the City has failed to address or

explain exactly why residential, as opposed to commercial zoning
will alleviate these problems.

In fact, commercial zoning would

solve any problem of commercial traffic through the subdivisions,
since full and complete ingress and egress would be obtained onto
and from 700 East.

However, since allowing residential access

through the existing commercial development is impracticable and
undesirable,

any

existing

traffic

problem

would

actually

be

exacerbated by residential development on the downzoned portion of
the Smiths1 property.
Furthermore, by forcing the Smiths to bear the expense of
alleviating

the

claimed

stub

street

problem,

Sandy

City

is

essentially demanding that the Smiths bear the expense of a public
benefit. No legal precedent requiring such a result exists and the
City's attempt to force such a conclusion should be forthwith
rejected and dismissed.
streets to the area.
were recorded

The Smiths did not extend the residential

Rather, most of the surrounding subdivisions

prior to the Smiths1

commercial zoning on the property.

purchasing

and

obtaining

Consequently, any concerns

about the stub streets should have been raised with the City in
1960, not in 1980.
15

The City's second concern involves access to any future
commercial development on the rear acreage.

Such access from 700

East could be obtained by simply making alterations in the existing
commercial development fronting 700 East.

Jack DeMass, an expert

land planner, surveyor and development consultant, has stated that
allowing such access for residential uses on the rear acreage is
impracticable and unworkable.

His opinions and conclusions remain

undisputed.
Finally, the City has asserted that "there may be excessive
commercially

zoned land."

Specifically, the existing 364,500

square feet of retail space exceeds the Commercial/Industrial Study
recommendation that Community Commercial should not exceed 250,000
square feet retail space.

Furthermore, the City planned to limit

the depth of 7 00 East commercial development to 2 00 feet unless
conditional

use

approval

was

granted.

However, upon

close

examination, these justifications do not lend any support to the
Cityfs decision and subsequent actions.

The depth suggestion

ignores the existence of other commercial developments along 7 00
East with depths that greatly exceed 2 00 feet2.

Furthermore, the

depth suggestion completely ignores the fact that the Sandy City

2

Directly across from the Smith property, on 7 00 East, is a
commercial zone which extends to a depth similar to that of the
entire Smith parcel. The commercial developments at the corner of
9400 South and 700 East are also much deeper than 200 feet.
16

Comprehensive Plan Goals & Policies expressly recommended a policy
which would preclude the development of typical strip commercial
and to allow 700 East to accomplish its function as an important
high volume traffic artery.

Since the downzoning limits the

Smiths1 commercially zoned property to a depth of about 200 feet,
it restricts the commercial development on the Smith property to
essentially a strip-type development.

In light of Sandy City's

failure to comply with its own stated goals and policies, it is
difficult to ascertain or discern any substantial relation to
public health, welfare or safety wrought by the downzoning.

The

plain fact is that Sandy City has done exactly what the law
prohibits.

It has ignored the Smiths1 private property rights and

interests and in so doing has turned a deaf ear to fundamental due
process.
B.

SANDY CITY»S DOWNZONING RESULTS IN AN
TAKING OF THE SMITHS1 PROPERTY.

UNCOMPENSATED

Even assuming, arguendo, that Sandy City's action was a valid
exercise of its police power, there can be no question that the
downzoning has resulted in an uncompensated taking which mandates
redress.

Not only does the downzoning fail to advance legitimate

governmental interests, it denies the Smiths the economically
viable use of their land.

Allowing a governmental entity to

effectuate a dramatic diminution in value and use of property for

17

the sole purpose of vaguely enunciated public goals with absolutely
no compensation to the landowner constitutes a direct violation of
established constitutional principles.
The United States Supreme Court has long noted that zoning
regulations may go too far, and thus constitute a taking, in some
circumstances.

"[A]ssuming . . . a proper exertion of the police

power, it does not follow that the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment would not safeguard to the owner just compensation for
the use of its property."

Delaware L. & W. R. Co. v. Morristown,

276 U.S. 192, 193 (1928) (citations omitted).
Here, Sandy City, with a single stroke of the pen, has
prevented any kind of commercial development on the rear 15.8 acres
of the Smiths1 property. This downzoning constitutes a deprivation
of the highest and best use of the property.

Jerry R. Webber, the

Smiths1 retained MAI appraiser,

stated in his Affidavit that the

downzoning

of

reduced

the

value

the

rear

acreage

by

over

$500,000.003, and stated unequivocally that the highest and best
use of the Smiths1 property is commercial.
Residential development, which is the option remaining to the
Smiths, is simply not economically warranted, as Jack DeMass stated

3

Mr. Webber's testimony is not offered to prove the exact
amount of damages, but, rather, to prove that the downzoning caused
substantial injury and damage to the Smiths1 property and property
interests.
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in his Affidavit4.

The rear acreage of the property is surrounded

on three sides by existing subdivisions which range in age from 3 0
to

35

years

with

older,

approximately the same age.

deteriorating

low-end

housing

of

The construction of new homes in the

midst of the existing development makes no economic sense and
without doubt such use is incompatible with the undisputed highest
and best use of the Smith property.
A rental community is not only unfeasible, it would likely
cause significant ingress and egress problems.

Such a community

consisting, for example, of duplexes, would necessitate intense
traffic through the existing subdivision streets.

Such a result

would obviously be detrimental to the existing community.

The

residential traffic would be unable to access 700 East through the
existing

Smith

commercial

development,

since

residential

and

commercial uses should not be mingled in that fashion, and there
are no public streets giving the residentially zoned area access to
700 East.

How Sandy City plans to deal with those problems which

it has specifically identified and condemned remains a mystery.
The trial court found that a taking did not exist because some
"reasonable use" of the property remained available to the Smiths.
Admittedly, some courts have held that, in order to be compensable,

4

The Affidavits of Mr. Webber and Mr. DeMass were both
before the trial court for consideration.
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a zoning change must remove all economically viable use of the
property; undoubtedly, Sandy City will assert this position in its
brief.

However, the better-reasoned legal analysis would not

require complete destruction of the economic use of the property as
a condition precedent to a finding that a compensable taking has
occurred.
A significant number of federal courts have held, in recent
decisions, that a denial of all economically viable uses of
property, even if such denial does not constitute a destruction of
all use, will result in a compensable taking. This is particularly
true since property owners frequently enjoy investment backed
expectations in certain types of development which are frustrated
by governmental regulation.
In Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. U.S.r 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed.Cir.
1994) , the landowners challenged, on takings grounds, the denial of
a fill permit which was necessary to complete an ongoing real
estate development.

The parcel consisted of 12.5 acres, 11.5 of

which were wetlands. The court noted that the fair market value of
the parcel prior to permit denial was $2,658,000, and $12,500 after
denial.

Id. at 1174-1175.

A regulation would go "too far," and

thus constitute a taking, based upon the following criteria: "(1)
the character of the governmental action; (2) the economic impact
of the regulation on the claimant, and (3) the extent to which the
20

regulation

interfered

expectations."

with

Id. at 1176.

distinct

investment-backed

In Loveladies, since the plaintiffs

purchased the land before denial of the permits, there was a
distinct investment-backed expectation in a certain development,
because the plaintiffs could not have known, when they purchased
the property, that the permits would be denied.

Id. at 1179.

Importantly, the Loveladies court recognized that the U.S.
Supreme Court had not yet ruled upon the issue of whether a partial
or complete loss of economic use is sufficient to constitute a
taking.
S.Ct.

In fact, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112
2886

(1992),

the

Court

discussed

both

approaches.

Loveladies, at 1180. However, the Loveladies court found that the
significant diminution in value in this case was sufficient to
constitute a taking.

Id. at 1181.

See Bowles v. U.S.r 31 Fed.CI.

37 (1994) (denial of fill permit constituted taking under less than
total deprivation analysis; denial of permit rendered construction
of single-family residences, which was the only economically viable
use

of the property,

and which was supported

by

investment

expectations, impossible).
In the recent case of K & K Constr. , Inc. , J.F.K. v.
Department of Natural Resources, 551 N.W.2d 413 (Mich. Ct. App.
1996) appeal granted 562 N.W.2d 788, the Michigan Court of Appeals
considered the issue of diminution.
21

The plaintiffs applied for a

permit to build a restaurant which was denied on the grounds that
the parcel included protected wetlands.

Plaintiffs challenged the

denial on Fifth Amendment grounds. Plaintiffs' experts opined that
the property was essentially worthless for any purpose other than
commercial development.

Id. at 419. The court noted that the area

surrounding the wetlands parcel could be developed as a restaurant;
however, such development was not economically feasible because of
land needs for a restaurant or any other commercial use, including
parking.

Consequently, a compensable taking had occurred.

Id.

The same decision was reached by the Iowa Supreme Court in
Kempf v. City of Iowa Cityr 402 N.W.2d 393 (Iowa 1987).

The

plaintiff had begun construction of an office building and the
first of five apartment structures on a 4 acre tract when its
building

permit

was

revoked,

and

the

zoning

changed.

The

plaintiff's expert testified that, before the downzoning, the value
of the remaining 2.12 acres was $2 00,000, and the value after the
downzoning was $52,000. Furthermore, construction of duplexes, the
remaining alternative, was not economically feasible.

The court

held that a taking had occurred, noting that:
[t]he overwhelming evidence discloses the lots and the
remaining 2.12 acres of the Kempf tract cannot be
improved with any development that would be economically
feasible. For this reason, we find that application of
the downzoning ordinance to the lots in the 2.12 acres
would be unreasonable.
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Id, at 399-400.
The Kempf court also expressly considered the plaintiff's
reasonable investment-backed expectations in development.

The

court noted that the plaintiff had made a "large investment" in
"filling, grading, and bringing in utilities for the whole tract in
reliance on the zoning and the city's study

. . . ."

Id.

Consideration of investment-backed expectations was also an express
part of the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992).
Here, the Smiths instituted commercial development on the
front portion of the property with the intent and expectation that,
eventually, the entire tract would be developed commercially. This
expectation is in accordance with the opinions of the Smiths'
experts that commercial development is the highest and best use of
the land, and the only feasible type of development.

Recognition

of these expectations, mandated by Lucas, requires a finding that
a compensable taking has occurred.
A liberal view of the deprivation of economic use rule is not
only

supported

Constitution.

by

case

law,

it

is

directed

by

the

Utah

Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution is

significantly broader than its federal counterpart.

That Section

provides: "[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation."
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(emphasis added).

The

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, of course, does
not refer to "damage."

Unfortunately, there is a scarcity of Utah

law interpreting this provision.

However, it is difficult to

imagine a clearer-cut basis for application of the provision than
the present case.

The severe economic damage to the Smiths,

coupled

City's

with

Sandy

failure

to

present

any

compelling

justification or purpose for the downzoning, mandates a finding
that a compensable taking has occurred.
II.
CONSTRUCTION OF THE BARRICADE ON 1055/1075
EAST STREET IS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND DOES
NOT ALLOW THE SMITHS REASONABLE ACCESS TO
THEIR PROPERTY.
Sandy

City's

insupportable.

barricade

It constitutes

of

1055/1075

East

Street

is

an abuse of the police power,

prevents the Smiths from reasonable access to their property, and
improperly restricts access to a street which has been dedicated to
the public.
In support of its action, Sandy City has attempted to assert
that it acted within its police power in barricading the subject
street, and, therefore, it is "unnecessary" for this Court to
review its action.
reviewable,

to

unconstitutional.

The actions of governmental entities are indeed
the

extent

that

they

are

arbitrary

or

State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1126 (Utah
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1980) (courts will review local decisions which are "arbitrary, or
[are] directly prohibited by . . .the state or federal laws or the
constitution of this state or of the United States").
Utah courts have not hesitated to review and invalidate local
ordinances which constitute invalid exercises of the police power.
See Gibbons & Reed Company v. North Salt Lake City, 431 P.2d 559
(Utah 1967) (holding that a zoning ordinance which prohibited the
removal of sand and gravel was an invalid exercise of the police
power, and would result in a severe loss to the landowners and to
the public).
Furthermore, Sandy City's action is in direct violation of
U.C.A. § 27-12-89, which deems a road used by the public for over
ten years to be dedicated to the public use.
admitted

in

its

Answers

to

Plaintiff's

As Sandy City
First

Set

of

Interrogatories, the road in question had been used by the public
for over twelve years when Sandy City erected the blockade.
The trial court erroneously concluded that the Smiths still
have reasonable access to their property.
dispute
access."

that

the

Also,

alternative

accesses

Sandy

has

City

However, the Smiths

constitute

incorrectly

"reasonable

asserted

that

compensation is not available where the plaintiff has reasonable
access.

Compensation is available where a governmental action

"substantially impairs a right appurtenant to an owner's
25

property . . . .If Three D Corp, v. Salt Lake Cityf 752 P. 2d 1321,
1326 (Utah Ct.App. 1988).

Here, the Smiths1 right to access their

property, and to provide the public access, has been substantially
impaired.
Sandy City also argues that the Smiths have not suffered a
physical taking and, therefore, are not entitled to compensation.
This assertion is clearly contrary to prevailing federal and state
law.

See Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 634 F.Supp. 100 (D.Utah

1986) (holding that low airplane overflights which constitute a
direct and immediate interference with the owner's land constitute
a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment), Boskovich v. Midvale
City Corp., 243 P. 2d 435 (Utah 1952) (compensable taking occurred
where the city closed a portion of a street to create a private
cul-de-sac).
CONCLUSION
The trial court's grant of summary judgment should be reversed
for two reasons.

First, Sandy City has downzoned a significant

portion of the Smiths' property without presenting any justifiable,
reasonable, or legally cognizable basis for doing so.

This

downzoning has deprived the Smiths of the economically viable use
of their property.

It is insupportable to permit Sandy City to

arbitrarily downzone the Smiths' property, depriving the Smiths of
their reasonable expectations of development, which expectations
26

were in fact encouraged by Sandy City, without the payment of any
compensation whatsoever.
Second, the barricades at the south end of 1055/1075 East
Street, a dedicated
authority

and

street, constitute yet another

infringement upon the Smiths1

abuse of

property rights.

Consequently, the trial court's entry of summary judgment on these
issues should be reversed and the Smiths awarded their costs.
DATED: July 9, 1997.

CAMPBELL^MAACK & SESSIONS
/

/

'^^//// %L

CLARK W. SESSION
KRISTINE EDDE
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ~f

y

day of July 1997, a true and

correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS was mailed,
postage prepaid, first-class, to:
Jody K. Burnett (0499)
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Post Office Box 45678

Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678

m,p m.f^n^

28
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SMITH INVESTMENT COMPANY,
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SANDY HILLS, INC.,
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vs.
SANDY CITY, et al.,
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Case No. 970008-CA
Priority No. 15
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EXHIBIT B
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 27-12-89 (1963)
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Tab A

JODY K BURNETT (A0499)
WILLIAMS & HUNT
Attorneys for Defendant
Sandy City
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Post Office Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
Telephone: (801) 521-5678
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SMITH INVESTMENT COMPANY, ET
AL.,

:
:
:

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER
OF DISMISSAL

V.

:

Civil No. 880901965 CV

SANDY CITY, ET AL. ,

:

Judge Timothy R. Hanson

Plaintiffs,

Defendants.

:

This matter came before the Court on February 2, 1996, for
oral argument on certain dispositive motions in these
consolidated cases pursuant to this Court's Pretrial Order of
November 30, 1995.

Plaintiffs were represented by Clark W.

Sessions and Kristine Edde.

Defendant Sandy City was represented

by Jody K Burnett and Kathleen R. Jeffery.

The claims against

defendant Utah Department of Transportation were previously
dismissed without prejudice by plaintiffs as set forth in the
Pretrial Order.
Pursuant to the provisions of the Pretrial Order, the Court
heard oral argument on motions for summary judgment regarding the
following issues:

1.

Cross-motions for summary judgment relating to

plaintiff's downzoning claims set forth in the Third Cause of
Action of Case No. C-88-1965.
2.

Defendant Sandy City's Motion for Summary Judgment on

the plaintiffs' claim that Sandy City wrongfully barricaded a
street designated as 1055/1075 East as set forth in Case
No. C-78-6419.
3.

Defendant Sandy City's Motion for Summary Judgment on

the plaintiffs' claim that drainage from the Brighton View and
De-1 Ruby Subdivisions which were approved by Sandy City
trespasses on plaintiffs' property as set forth in the Second
Cause of Action of Case No. C-88-1965.
The Court having reviewed the legal memoranda and exhibits
of the parties and having considered the oral argument of
counsel, and being fully advised, issued its Memorandum Decision
dated May 21, 1996.

Pursuant to that Memorandum Decision, it is

hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as follows:
1.

With respect to the parties' cross-motions for summary

judgment on the plaintiffs' downzoning claim as set forth in the
Third Cause of Action of Case No. C-88-1965, defendant Sandy
City's Motion for Summary Judgment on the downzoning issue is
hereby granted for the reasons advanced by defendant Sandy City
in its moving papers and oral argument, and on the grounds
identified in the Memorandum Decision of May 21, 1996, that the
Court is satisfied there is a sufficient basis in the record to
support the defendant's rezoning of the subject property from

commercial as it was originally established in the early 1960s,
to residential (not totally residential) in 1981.

The record

supports a reasonable basis for effecting the zoning change of
1981.

The test of a rational relationship to public health,

safety and welfare is supported in the record.

Further, it does

not appear that the rezoning has resulted in plaintiffs being
unable to use the property in question for any reasonable use,
and therefore no "taking" exists under the rezoning.

As the

plaintiffs could put the property to multiple reasonable uses,
other than the expansion of the plaintiffs' commercial
environment that exists along the frontage of the property, there
is not a "taking."

The Court rejects the plaintiffs' legal

theory that a diminution in value based upon the plaintiffs not
being able to use the property for the plaintiffs' perceived
highest and best use is a basis upon which to conclude that there
has been a "taking."
2.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on the

downzoning claim set forth in the Third Cause of Action of Case
No. C-88-1965 is denied on the grounds set forth above.
3.

Defendant Sandy City's Motion for Summary Judgment on

the plaintiffs' claim that drainage from the Brighton View and
Del Ruby Subdivisions which were approved by Sandy City
trespasses on plaintiffs' property as set forth in the Second
Cause of Action of Case No. C-88-1965 is hereby granted for the
reasons advanced by defendant Sandy City in its moving papers and
oral argument, and on the grounds identified in the Memorandum

Decision of May 21, 1996, that the trespass claim stems from an
approval by Sandy City of Brighton View and Del Ruby Subdivisions
many years ago.

The approval of those subdivision plats do not

support a cause of action for escaping water from property owned
by various non-named landowners adjacent to the plaintiffs'
property.

While plaintiffs may have a cause of action for the

claimed escaping water, it is not against the defendant Sandy
City upon the basis alleged.
4.

Defendant Sandy City's Motion for Summary Judgment on

the plaintiffs' claim that Sandy City wrongfully barricaded a
street designated as 1055/1075 East as set forth in Case
No. C-78-6419 is hereby granted for the reasons advanced by
defendant Sandy City in its moving papers and oral argument, and
on the grounds identified in the Memorandum Decision of May 21,
1996, that the record shows that the street is part of an
adjacent subdivision that abuts the plaintiffs' undeveloped
property.

The pavement ends at the plaintiffs' property line,

and Sandy City has apparently placed a barricade prohibiting
vehicular traffic from leaving the end of the paved street to
come upon the plaintiffs' undeveloped property.

While at some

future time it may be appropriate to have the barricade removed
should the street be extended into what is now the plaintiffs'
property, the City's action in barricading the end of the paved
street at the property line between the developed subdivision and
the plaintiffs' property is appropriate.

The plaintiff has other

access to its undeveloped property, and there presently exists no

legitimate claim against Sandy City for blocking vehicular
traffic at the end of the paved section of the roadway.
All other issues between the parties have been resolved.
Based on the foregoing orders and for the reasons more fully set
forth above, all of plaintiffs/ claims and complaints in the
consolidated matters as referenced in the Pretrial Order of
November 30, 1995, are hereby DISMISSED, with prejudice and upon
the merits, no cause of action.
DATED this ^ 3 ^ day of Seft^.

, 1996.

BY THE COURT:

By

bj
Timothy R. Hanson
District Court Judge

AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

)
:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss.

Beverly Riemann, being duly sworn, says that she is employed
in the law offices of Williams & Huntf attorneys for defendant
Sandy City herein; that she served the attached proposed
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL in Civil No, 880901965CV in the
Third District Court for Salt Lake County, upon the parties
listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an
envelope addressed to:
Counsel for Plaintiffs
Clark W. Sessions
One Utah Center - 13th Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake Cit^y, UT 84101-1605
Kathleen R. Jeffery
Sandy City Corporation
10000 Centennial Parkway
Sandy, UT 84070
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid,
on the 14th day of June, 1996.

;
ly Rifei
Beverly
Rifemann

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this
September, 1996,
U

$

day of

'(MuJ D xlUjU(fhy

fotafcy Public
isirdina in the S t a t e pt

Utah
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DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

Art. I, § 22

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Appointment of administrator of estate.
This section prohibits the appointment of a
person to serve as administrator of a decedent's
estate if that person refuses to consent to such
appointment In re Estate of duff, 587 P.2d
128 (Utah 1978)

In general
Appointment of administrator of estate
Withholding tax
In general.
No man can have a vested interest in the
work or labor of another, nor has he a right to
insist that another work for him, since that
would violate this section McGrew v Industrial Comm'n, 96 Utah 203, 85 P.2d 608 (1938)

Withholding tax.
Provision requiring that a city withhold
state income taxes due from employees does
not subject the city to involuntary servitude
Salt Lake City v State Tax Comm'n, 11 Utah
2d 359, 359 P.2d 397 (1961)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 45 Am Jur 2d Involuntary
Servitude and Peonage § 1 et seq

C.J.S. — 70 C.J.S Peonage § 3, 80 C.J.S
Slaves § 10
Key Numbers. — Slaves «= 24

Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation
History: Const. 1896.
Cross-References. — Eminent domain gen«
erally § 78-34-1 et seq
NOTES TO DECISIONS
erty shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation, and does not
require compensation to be paid in advance
Anderson Inv Corp v State, 28 Utah 2d 379,
503 P.2d 144 (1972)

ANALYSIS

Advance pavment of compensation
Airplane overflights
Closing street
Consequential damages
—Railroad
—Road construction
—School construction
Defense to condemnation proceeding
Elements of taking or damage
Fair market value
Section self-executing
Highway easement
Intangible factors
Interest in condemnation proceedings
Inverse condemnation
Just compensation
Municipal employment prerequisites
Removal of personal property
Services of attornev in defending indigent
Statute of limitations

Airplane overflights.
For discussion of taking issues in an action
by landowners alleging that their land has
been "taken" by overflights, see Katsos v Salt
Lake City Corp , 634 F Supp 100 (D Utah
1986)

Taxes

Water rights
Cited
Advance payment of compensation.
This section provides merely that the prop-

Closing street.
Where city, without notice, petition, or hearing, closes a portion of a street and alley abutting on school board-owned property on both
sides and used for vehicular travel, and thus
creates a cul-de-sac as to privately owned property, there has been a taking requiring just
compensation Boskovich v Midvale City
Corp, 121 Utah 445, 243 P2d 435 (1952)
Closing of city street and alleged impairment of access to commercial properties was
not a "damaging" or "taking" within the meaning of this section, the alleged damages resulted from a temporary, one-time occurrence
and not a permanent, continuous, or inevitably
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AMENDMENT V—GRAND JURY INDICTMENT FOR CAPITAL
CRIMES; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; SELF-INCRIMINATION;
DUE PROCESS OF LAW; JUST COMPENSATION FOR
PROPERTY
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.
HISTORICAL NOTES
Proposal and Ratification
were ratified on December 15, 1791.
The first ten amendments to the Con- For the states which ratified these
stitution were proposed to the Legisla- amendments, and the dates of rattures of the several states by the First ification, see Historical Notes under
Congress on September 25, 1789, and Amendment I.

WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH
WESTLAW supplements U.S.C.A. electronically and is useful for additional
research. Enter a citation in INSTA-CITE for display of parallel citations
and case history. Enter a constitution, statute or rule citation in a case law
database for cases of interest.
Example query for INSTA-CITE: 790 F.2d 978
Example query for United States Constitution: (first +6 amendment) +s
religion
Example query for statute: "42 U.S.C.*" 4-4 1983
Also, see the WESTLAW guide following the Explanation pages of this
volume.

A m e n d m e n t V.

Grand Jury Indictment for Capital Crimes

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; * *
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AMENDMENT XIV—CITIZENSHIP; PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES; DUE PROCESS; EQUAL PROTECTION; APPORTIONMENT OF REPRESENTATION; DISQUALIFICATION
OF OFFICERS; PUBLIC DEBT; ENFORCEMENT
Materials for the Citizenship and Privileges and Immunities
Clauses of Section 1 are set out in this volume. See the
following three volumes for materials pertaining to the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of that section and
Sections 2 to 5.
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of
electors for President and Vice President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a
State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of
the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age,
and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in
Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold any
office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State,
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or
as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State
legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort
to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds
of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States,
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebel537

Amend. 14

CONSTITUTION

lion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any
State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of
insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for
the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
HISTORICAL NOTES
Proposal and Ratification
This amendment was proposed to the
legislatures of the several States by the
Thirty-ninth Congress, on June 13, 1866.
On July 21, 1868, Congress adopted and
transmitted to the Department of State a
concurrent resolution, declaring that
"the legislatures of the States of Connecticut, Tennessee, New Jersey, Oregon,
Vermont, New York, Ohio, Illinois, West
Virginia, Kansas, Maine, Nevada, Missouri, Indiana, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Iowa,
Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, Alabama, South Carolina, and Louisiana,
being three-fourths and more of the several States of the Union, have ratified
the fourteenth article of amendment to
the Constitution of the United States,
duly proposed by two-thirds of each
House of the Thirty-ninth Congress:
Therefore, Resolved, That said fourteenth article is hereby declared to be a
part of the Constitution of the United
States, and it shall be duly promulgated
as such by the Secretary of State." The
Secretary of State accordingly issued a
proclamation, dated July 28, 1868, declaring that the proposed fourteenth
amendment had been ratified by the legislatures of thirty of the thirty-six States.
The amendment was ratified by the State
Legislatures on the following dates:
Connecticut, June 25, 1866; New Hampshire, July 6, 1866; Tennessee, July 19,
1866; New Jersey, Sept. 11, 1866; Oregon, Sept. 19, 1866; Vermont, Oct. 30,
1866; Ohio, Jan. 4, 1867; New York,
Jan. 10, 1867; Kansas, Jan. 11, 1867;
Illinois, Jan. 15, 1867; West Virginia,

Jan. 16, 1867; Michigan, Jan. 16, 1867;
Minnesota, Jan. 16, 1867; Maine, Jan'
19, 1867; Nevada, Jan. 22, 1867;
Indiana, Jan. 23, 1867; Missouri, Jan'
25, 1867; Rhode Island, Feb. 7, 1867;'
Wisconsin, Feb. 7, 1867; Pennsylvania,'
Feb. 12, 1867; Massachusetts, Mar. 20,
1867; Nebraska, June 15, 1867; Iowa!
Mar. 16, 1868; Arkansas, Apr. 6, 1868;
Florida, June 9, 1868; North Carolina!
July 4, 1868; Louisiana, July 9, 1868South Carolina, July 9, 1868; Alabama'
July 13, 1868; Georgia, July 21, 1868!
Subsequent to the proclamation the following States ratified this amendment:
Virginia, Oct. 8, 1869; Mississippi, Jan
17, 1870; Texas, Feb. 18, 1870; Delaware, Feb. 12, 1901; Maryland, Apr. 4
1959; California, May 6, 1959; and Kentucky, Mar. 18, 1976.
The Fourteenth Amendment originally
was rejected by Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Texas and Virginia. However, the State
Legislatures of the aforesaid States subsequently ratified the amendment on the
dates set forth in the preceding paragraph. Kentucky and Maryland rejected
this amendment on Jan. 10, 1867 and
Mar. 23, 1867, respectively.
The States of New Jersey, Ohio and
Oregon "withdrew" their consent to the
ratification of this amendment on Mar.
24, 1868, Jan. 15, 1868, and Oct. 15,
1868, respectively.
The State of New Jersey expressed
support for this amendment on Nov. 12,
1980.
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(i) the permission shall contain the condition that any installation will be removed from the right-of-way at the request of the
city or town; and
(ii) the city or town shall cause any installation to be removed
at the request of the department when the department finds the
removal necessary:
(A) to eliminate a hazard to traffic safety;
(B) for the construction and maintenance of the state
highway; or
(C) to meet the requirements of federal regulations.
(3) If it is necessary that a utility, as defined in Section 27-12-11, be
relocated on federal-aid highways, reimbursement shall be made for the
relocation as provided for in Section 27-12-11.
(4) (a) The department shall construct curbs, gutters, and sidewalks on
the state highways when it is found necessary by the department for
the proper control of traffic, driveway entrances, or drainage.
(b) If a state highway is widened or altered and existing curbs,
gutters, and sidewalks are removed, the department shall replace the
curbs, gutters, and sidewalks.
(5) The department may furnish and install street lighting systems for
the state highways, but their operation and maintenance is the responsibility of the city or town.
(6) If new storm sewer facilities are necessary in the construction and
maintenance of the state highways, the cost of the storm sewer facilities
shall be borne by the state and the city or town in a proportion mutually
agreed upon between the department and the highway authorities of the
city or town.
(7) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act, the department may make rules governing the location
and construction of approach roads and driveways entering the state
highway, and the department may delegate the administration of the rules
to the highway authorities of the city or town.
History- L- 1963. ch. 39, § 88; 1991, ch.
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994,
137, § 21; 1994, ch. 120, § 36.
substituted "for highways" for "with respect to
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- streets" in the introductory language; subdiment, effective April 29, 1991, redivided Sub- vided Subsection (2); substituted "department"
section (1) into present Subsections (1) to (3); for "commission" in Subsections (6) and (7);
redesignated former Subsections (2) to (5) as added the code citation in Subsection (7); and
present Subsections (3) to (7); substituted "de- made stylistic changes,
partment" for "state road commission" throughout the section; and made changes in punctuation and phraseology.

ARTICLE 6
ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY FOR HIGHWAY
PURPOSES
27-12-89. Public use constituting dedication.
A highway shall be deemed to have been dedicated and abandoned to the use
of the public when it has been continuously used as a pubhc thoroughfare for
a period of ten years.
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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
332 STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
January 2, 1997
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
CLARK W. SESSIONS
KRISTINE EDDE
CAMPBELL, MAACK & SESSIONS
201 S MAIN 13TH FL
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111-2215

Smith Investment Company,
a Utah corporation, and
Sandy Hills, Inc., a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
Sandy City, et al.,
Defendants and Appellees.

No. 960486
960708-CA
880901965CV

Pursuant to the authority vested in this Court, this case
is poured-over to the Court of Appeals for disposition.
All further pleadings and correspondence should be directed to
that Court. The address is 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84102.
Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk

